South Dakota would not receive highway funds if they did not raise the legal drinking age from 19 to 21. Is it permissible for the federal government to place conditions or "strings" on federal funds? In South Dakota v. Dole, it was concluded that yes, the Congressional power to spend money allows Congress to set the rules and place conditions on federal grants.  

Plessy v. Ferguson established the "separate but equal" doctrine in 1896. The court case established the practice of racial segregation in public facilities, which would be "separate, but equal." This doctrine was finally overturned by Brown v. Board of Education in 1954. 

This is another relatively difficult question. That said, there are a few clues that should have pointed you in the right direction. The correct answer is “violation of separation of powers.” The reasoning is fairly elemental, although the case may involve several positions with which you are not familiar. In essence, Congress delegated to the Comptroller General the ability to immediately slash the budget in the event that a level of the federal deficit were exceeded (this, of course, is somewhat oversimplified). Although the Comptroller General was subject to impeachment by Congress, the Court held that the Comptroller General’s ability to slash funds intruded on the rights of the Executive Branch, and thus was a violation of the separation of powers doctrine.

This is a difficult question. The Supreme Court struck down the legislative or one-house veto in INS v. Chadha. Mr. Chadha’s story is both sad an incredibly interesting. Chadha was born in Kenya (when it was a British colony) to Indian parents, and then traveled to the US on a visa. Neither Kenya, nor India (nor Britain) recognized him as a citizen, and he clearly was not a citizen of the US. Unfortunately for him, when his visa expired, he couldn’t get a renewal (because no country claimed him as a citizen), at which point the INS began deportation proceedings against him (although your guess is as good as mine as to where he was going to be deported). After Chadha objected, the INS stayed his deportation and alerted the House of Representatives. The House, however, used the “legislative veto” to override the stay and directed the INS to deport him. The case goes all the way to the Supreme Court, and SCOTUS strikes the legislative veto as unconstitutional—a violation of separation of powers.

In this case, the 1996 Communications Decency Act had language in it that sought to limit indecency and obscenity, particularly in the various forms of media (mail, television, internet, etc.). The Supreme Court ruled that the 1st Amendment had been seriously violated because of the broad speech in the Communications Act that failed to protect the rights of adult citizens (freedom of expression, namely).

Indecency can be protected by the 1st Amendment, but the Court uses the Miller test to determine if words or expressions are unlawful (obscene).

The Supreme Court Case Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey (1992) was a group response to several requirements for women to abide by if they decided to have an abortion. Pennsylvania had altered their abortion law to include requirements that including women having to wait 24 hours before going through with it and minors needing parental consent.

The Court upheld Roe v. Wade and women's right to choose for themselves, but also supported the legality of some of the Pennsylvania law. They also created the "undue burden" standard to create a scale by which to measure abortion laws throughout the states - if a law puts an undue burden on a women in one of these situations, then it can be reasonably inferred that it is unconstitutional.

While the Supreme Court takes any claim of discrimination quite seriously, it applies its strictest standards, most rigorous reviews, and most often rules against acts of racial and/or ethnic discrimination. When the Court accepts any case which alleges discrimination, the justices first apply standards of review, or a tiered system of evaluation, to assess both the possible presence and severity of the alleged discriminatory activity. In most instances, the Court upholds only those alleged acts of discrimination which can be proven to be “reasonable” – this means that as long as the defendant is able to show that the restriction in question has a logical and necessary purpose, then no qualified discriminatory act was therefore committed. For example, perhaps a worker in their seventies is fired and so sues their employer for age discrimination. If the employer can show that the job which s/he manages requires physical and mental fitness (or other priorities which diminish with age), then the Court will most likely rule that no age discrimination was committed and the elderly worker will have lost their case. However, the Court pays special attention to alleged instances of racial and/or ethnic discrimination, which it views with automatic skepticism and therefore evaluates with the strictest possible standards in mind. An employer who is accused of racial bias, for example, must prove before the Court that s/he is innocent; the Court does not take into consideration the so-called logic of the restrictive action (as with age and/or gender discrimination) and most often finds the defendant guilty.

Marbury v. Madison was the first case in which the Supreme Court asserted its powers of judicial review to strike down unconstitutional legislation. These powers have been the primary function of the Supreme Court throughout the history of the United States, and thus it makes sense that the case in which these powers were first asserted occurred very early in the country's history.

Remember that McCulloch v. Maryland is a fairly early case, as cases go (1819), and that it was before the Marshall Court, so it probably had to do with expanding or limiting federal power. The backdrop to McCulloch is extremely interesting, and I encourage you to read about it, as we’ll discuss it only briefly here. Essentially, the bank of the U.S. gets re-chartered (that is, legislatively renewed), and it is immensely unpopular. What made it even worse, from the anti-bank point of view, was that it had branches (offshoot banks) in different states! If you guessed the Maryland was one of those states, you are correct.

Maryland, being rather anti-bank in sentiment, attempted to figure out a way to get rid of the pesky new bank without resorting to the time-honored approach of torching it. The next best thing, Maryland figured, would be to tax the bank out of existence. So, in a (failed) attempt to be subtle, Maryland levies a 2% tax on all “foreign” banks (that is, banks NOT chartered in Maryland). Since the Bank of the U.S. was not technically chartered in Maryland, Maryland attempted to enforce their law, and collect the tax from the bank agent, McCulloch.

Unsurprisingly, McCulloch decided he’d rather not pay the tax, and the case ensued. Maryland argued that the Constitution did not explicitly grant to Congress the power to create a bank, thus they should not be able to. Marshall, writing for the court, explains that while the Constitution does not explicitly grant Congress the power to charter a bank, it is one of Congress’ inherent powers under the Necessary and Proper Clause. Furthermore, given that Congress can charter a bank, Maryland may not tax it as the “power to tax involves the power to destroy” and the state cannot destroy the federal government, under the Supremacy Clause.

This 2005 Supreme Court case concerned the issue of eminent domain, as the City of New London, Connecticut wanted to take private property in order to sell it to private property developers so that they could develop the land and in the process create jobs and bring in more tax money. Kelo, and other property owners, felt that the city’s seizure of property was not protected by the 5^th Amendment, which guarantees eminent domain, because the property was being taken for private citizens and businesses. The Supreme Court ruled 5-4 that the city could take the property, since selling it and developing it was designed to benefit everyone within the city and that purpose was protected under eminent domain.